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a b s t r a c t
We posit a life-cycle hypothesis for the evolving role of National Development Banks (NDBs) using the
case of one of the largest such institutions in the world, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). NDBs
are a particularly important institution for channeling long-term credit in less developed ﬁnancial mar-
kets. However, we argue that as countries develop their ﬁnancial markets, NDBs should share this role
with other local banks and specialize their focus, eventually disappearing altogether. In the Brazilian case,
we show how the BNDES evolved from a purveyor of long-term credit to a more complex ﬁnancial insti-
tution. The BNDES was the most important tool used by the Brazilian government as a countercyclical
response to the ﬁnancial crisis. For many developing countries, institutions like the BNDES may be a ten-
able solution for building long-term local ﬁnancial institutions and markets, and developing specialized
human capital. However, they also pose potential risks centered on issues of scalability, crowding out,
graft and inefﬁciency.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Since the First World War, industrialized and less developed
countries have tried to bridge long-term ﬁnancing needs through
the creationofNationalDevelopmentBanks (NDBs). Over the years,
the relevance of NDBs has waned in many nations, while in oth-
ers governments still use them as a major or the main source of
long-term credit. Over the years, the roles of many NDBs changed,
from being a means to achieve industrialization to the pursuit of
much more diverse objectives ranging from microﬁnance to stu-
dent loans.
Understanding the trade-offs in terms of a dynamic framework
allows policy makers to decide on how to handle the creation (and
dissolution) of such institutions, the choice of ﬁnancial products to
be supplied, and thebestway tomanage themefﬁciently.NDBs rep-
resent a polarizing subject. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2002) argue that any form of government ownership of banks
generates slower ﬁnancial development Other critics allege a lack
of transparency, a tendency to privilege certain economic groups,
and highlight the fact that NDB loans have a high level of subsidies
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(Bond, 2013). However, NDBs clearly address amarket failure in the
long-term credit market of emerging markets, and their support-
ers emphasize the importance of NDBs for accelerated economic
development (Gutierrez, Rudolph, Homa, & Blanco Beneit, 2011).
Here we posit a life-cycle hypothesis that combines historical
analytical evidence with a review of the implications of the recent
deepening of ﬁnancial markets, establishing trade-offs that change
asNDBs and localmarkets develop. Ourmainquestion is as follows:
in the presence of institutional voids that generate inefﬁcient and
incomplete ﬁnancialmarkets, areNationalDevelopment Banks still
relevant to bridge gaps in long-term credit markets in the develop-
ment process? Speciﬁcally, we analyze the role of NDBs as bridges
between the need to originate speciﬁc long-term credits, and the
orientation of local private sector ﬁnancial markets.
We contribute to the literature by presenting a life-cycle
hypothesis in which NDBs are initially a particularly powerful
institutional form for earmarking long-term credit in shallow and
inefﬁcient ﬁnancial markets. However, in due course, as ﬁnancial
markets and countries develop, NDBs should become less relevant.
We also present an analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of creating
NDBs. This builds on the literature and presents a contemporary
take on the possibility of creating NDBs from scratch in emerging
markets.Anauxiliaryhypothesis is that, givenacomparatively solid
institutional background, it is possible to use NDBs to jumpstart
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2016.07.006
1062-9769/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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latent long-term credit in local markets. We explore the necessary
conditions for this to happen and point to major sources of risk.
We use as our case study the Brazilian National Bank for
Economic and Social Development (BNDES), one of the largest
development banks in the world. The BNDES focuses its attention
on funding the investment projects and exports of large Brazil-
ian companies. We show how the institution evolved from being
a purveyor of long-term credit to playing a more complex role
in the Brazilian economy, including the possibility of inefﬁcient
actions, such as when it builds minority stakes in Brazilian com-
panies (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013). We conclude that for
manydeveloping countries, institutions such as the BNDESmaynot
be the best solution for long-term ﬁnance. However, the BNDES
does provide a tenable institutional experience that offers useful
insights for building NDBs to ﬁll an institutional void in emerging
markets, even if there are risks in using such institutions to correct
ﬁnancial market failures.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next
section,webrieﬂy review the literature onNDBs in order to provide
the basis for the life-cycle hypothesis. In the second section, we
present the hypothesis and analyze the most important tools avail-
able for governments to earmark credit, with beneﬁts and costs of
using NDBs. The third section presents data highlighting the signif-
icance of the BNDES for the development of the Brazilian economy,
while the fourth discusses the replicability of the Brazilian NDB
‘model’ for other less developed countries. In the last section, we
offer some ﬁnal comments.
2. On the role of development banks
Development banks are an important government tool for
earmarking credit. Aghion (1999) has deﬁned national develop-
ment banks (NDBs) as government-sponsoredﬁnancial institutions
concerned primarily with the provision of long-term capital to
industry. For the purposes of this article we add two caveats to
this deﬁnition. The ﬁrst is to concentrate on NDBs that use mostly
domestic sources of funding, and the second tohighlight the impor-
tance ofNDBs in originating credit to non-ﬁnancial corporations, by
means of loans or capitalmarket operations. These caveats are rele-
vant because most of the literature focuses on development banks
or government-owned banks in a broader sense than we intend
here.
The golden age of national development banks began in the
1950s, when developing countries in many regions sought rapid
industrialization. It lasted through the 1980s, when a wave of
privatization saw more than 250 state-owned banks privatized
(Meggison, 2004). The Washington Consensus curtailed the role
of national development banks in the growth of local capital mar-
kets (Bruck, 1998). However, after the recent ﬁnancial crisis many
countries resorted to NDBs to smooth the effects of the liquid-
ity and credit squeeze associated with the crisis. There is a clear
strand of the literature that considers NDBs to be both inefﬁcient
and market-distorting (La Porta et al., 2002; World Bank, 2013).
However, despite this NDBs are prevalent and present an impor-
tant source of long-term capital in many countries (Gutierrez et al.,
2011; Luna-Martinez & Vicente, 2012).
NDBs have diversiﬁed their operations over time, from dab-
bling in microﬁnance to insurance mechanisms, alongside new
ﬁelds such as advisory, consultancy and training services; working
capital and bridge ﬁnancing; programs for institutional building
(from human capital to entrepreneurial development); privati-
zation design and implementation; credit allocation to climate
change mitigation (Smallridge et al., 2013); and even straightfor-
ward portfolio building. However, the main role of NDBs is still
to act in underﬁnanced areas. These would include the creation
of credit to ﬁnance long-term investments; mitigation of market
failures arising from costly and asymmetric information; and the
existence of externalities that result in underfunding of socially
valuable projects (Gutierrez et al., 2011), alongside other devel-
opment goals (Yeyati, Micco, & Panizza, 2007).
There is no consensus on the effectiveness of national devel-
opment banks for economic growth. While, on the one hand,
government-led credit allocation can help countries faced with
ﬁnancial repression and incomplete and inefﬁcient capitalmarkets,
on the other hand itmayhinder thedevelopment of efﬁcient capital
markets. What we do know is that most of the developed countries
have at some point used, or still use, NDBs. There are no counter-
factuals to the usage of NDBs in the development process, and they
are still relevant players in many markets today.
We advocate a life-cycle hypothesis regarding the role of NDBs:
these institutions may increase the pace of industrialization and
growth, especially for the passage from ‘developing’ to ‘middle-
income’ stages, with their main role being credit creation through
direct mechanisms. As local markets develop, direct mechanisms
lead to indirect mechanisms, such as guarantees and interest rate
equalization; and when markets are truly formed, there should be
no need for the presence of NDBs, unless in a minor role for speciﬁc
sectors such as housing.
3. The life-cycle hypothesis of development banks
Financial repression and incompleteness of ﬁnancial markets
deters growth (Levine & Zervos, 1998). However, as Levine (1997,
2005) has noted, there is little consensus as to the form this
relationship might take; for the great majority of authors, ﬁnan-
cial development determines (although does not cause) economic
development.
There is some evidence on the relationship between govern-
ment ownership of ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial develop-
ment, but it relies on public-ownership of banks in general and
not NDB activities in particular. La Porta et al. (2002) ﬁnd that
higher government ownership of banks leads to slower ﬁnancial
development and lower growth of per capita income and produc-
tivity,whileMicco, Panizza, andYanez (2007)ﬁnd that state-owned
banks in developing countries tend to have lower proﬁtability and
higher costs than private banks, as do Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper,
and Udell (2005). However, Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) show that
for non-recourse project ﬁnance loans, the participation of devel-
opment banks in the loan syndicate helps to mitigate political
risk.
The work of La Porta et al. (2002) has sparked a marked con-
troversy regarding the role of government in the banking system.
Since then some studies have argued that the evidence in La Porta
et al. (2002) is ﬂawed (Yeyati et al., 2007). Körner and Schnabel
(2011) ﬁnd a negative impact of high NDB market share on growth
only in countries with a low degree of ﬁnancial development and
low institutional quality. However, Andrianova, Demetriades, and
Shortland (2008) ﬁnd that higher state ownership in the banking
sector is associatedwith fastergrowth, and that institutional factors
are more important than the origin of capital.
Therefore, what do we know about the role of NDBs for devel-
opment? Actually, not much has changed in the last 20 years. The
two main strands of the literature for and against the usage of
NDBs are still going strong, and the empirical evidence is mixed.
We have precious little empirical evidence on the inner workings
of NDBs but we do know that they still compose a large part of
some national ﬁnancial systems. Here we put forward a life-cycle
hypothesis for the existence of NDBs, in which they emerge in
countries with some solid institutions but incomplete and inefﬁ-
cientﬁnancialmarkets; growupalongside industrializationand the
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Fig. 1. Life-cycle of national development banks.
development of ﬁnancial markets; and wither and die as countries
fully develop, a pattern that is depicted in Fig. 1.
This life cycle is conditional on the costs and beneﬁts of NDB
actions in a market economy. Beneﬁts are conditional on the inter-
action between growth, industrialization, and the development of
ﬁnancial markets, diminishing over time. Maximizing social wel-
fare means relying more on credit creation in the early stages,
and going to indirect mechanisms, less costly in ﬁscal terms, as
countries develop. Throughout, there are governance issues associ-
ated with NDBs. We start by analyzing governance issues and then
positing beneﬁts and risks associated with NDBs roles in market
economies.
3.1. Governance issues
The role of state owned banks is not limited to managing gov-
ernment funds. Their operations can also be funded by accessing
regular ﬁnancial markets or even individual savers. The reliance
on market sources, however, imposes limitations on state owned
banks in terms of ﬁxing interest rates, maturities and other terms
and conditions. In other words, this reliance places constraints on
the discretionary power of NDBs to allocate resources.
In the past NDBs were, especially in emerging markets, black
boxes. However, todayweunderstand that tomaximize their effec-
tiveness while minimizing risks, there are important governance
issues. First, governance should be based on professional man-
agement as the primary legislative choice (Horn, 1995), and focus
on investment projects that are long-term, but at the same time
present reasonable risk. Second, NDBs should follow Basel and
other regulatory frameworks, and focus on regular risk manage-
mentmodels. Third,NDBresource allocation shouldbe transparent,
both to decrease the likelihood of graft and political pressure. Our
argument is in line with Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) regarding
the actions of state owned companies in ﬁnancial markets. The
authors argue that good governance can overcome some of the
classic problems of state ownership.
3.2. Instruments of earmarking credits and of national
development banks
We can divide the instruments for earmarking credit into two
categories, according to the credit origination process. The ﬁrst
one, direct origination, is derived from the ability of a NDB to
autonomously originate debt or equity. It can provide terms and
conditions for new debt (interest rate, maturity and guarantees)
different from those prevailing in the market. In the early stages of
development, NDBs can be the main government tool to earmark
credit for capital expenditures in different industries.
The second category, indirect origination, is the mechanism
through which NDBs create incentives to stimulate other ﬁnancial
intermediaries to originate loans related to government targeted
investment projects, companies or industrial sectors. These incen-
tives can be further divided into provision of long-term funds;
guarantees; equalization; and, less commonly, penalties.
3.2.1. Provision of funds
Adequate supply of long-term funds in local currency is an
essential feature of development, and particularly important in
early stages of industrialization. In this case, commercial banksmay
reﬁnance some of their loans with a government entity, which can
be a special fund or a state owned bank. This mechanism strongly
demands the use of ﬁscal or quasi-ﬁscal resources. In Brazil, this is
themodel of BNDES’s operationswith commercial banks. Provision
of funds can be particularly effective if alternative private funding
is scarce or expensive, and it gives governments more autonomy
regarding interest rates and maturity. Additionally, tax rebates or
subsidies can encourage ﬁnancial institutions to grant loans with
lower interest rates or better terms than they would normally offer
to a speciﬁc set of clients, e.g. low-income family farmers, small and
mediumenterprises, exporters of high domestic content goods, etc.
3.2.2. Guarantees
Through a guarantee or credit insurance, the government holds,
under certain conditions, all or part of the risk of a loan. In exchange,
the cost of funding for the ﬁnal borrower are reduced to a level
closer to the rates charged for public debt that, normally, are the
lowest cost of funding in the local market. Guarantee schemes
are very efﬁcient from a ﬁscal point of view. They generate rev-
enues (commissions and insurance premiums) up front and only
require disbursement of public funds in the case of default. In the
United States, government guarantees for private credit are widely
used, accounting for 46% of the mortgage market in 2010 (Jaffee
& Quigley, 2012). The main advantage of using guarantees mecha-
nisms is the low demand for ﬁscal resources, but unlike provision
of funds, this indirect mechanism do not create credit and, as such,
does not work when credit markets are shallow, being more useful
only in later stages of a NDB life-cycle.
3.2.3. Equalization
Another important indirect mechanism is the subsidy or equal-
ization of interest rates. In this case, the government pays directly
to the lender part of the cost of a ﬁnancial operation. This is away to
lower the interest rate offered to ﬁnal borrowers. The present ﬁscal
cost of this typeof instrument is greater than that resulting fromthe
use of guarantees, but the government no longer has the contingent
burden to repay the debt in case of default. In the past, equalization
was widely used by European export credit agencies. The impact
on the public budget depends on the amounts equalized and the
rates of equalization. In less developed countries, local ﬁnancial
markets may impose high discount rates for public guarantees and
future ﬂow of subsidies and, therefore, reduce their effectiveness.
The market may charge very high rates for public credit or the risks
involved in thepaymentmechanismsof these indirectmechanisms
may be regarded as too risky for private institutions, which affects
the ability of a Treasury guarantee or subsidy to reduce the cost of
private loans.
3.2.4. Penalties
The ﬁnal means of indirect providing funds for socially targeted
sectors is to create compulsory allocative rules for private funds.
Insteadofofferingpremiums, thegovernment imposespenaltieson
banks that fail tomeet speciﬁc goals. Suchmechanisms are increas-
ingly less common around the world. In Brazil, they are found in
some of the Central Bank’s regulations, which require commercial
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banks to extend a minimum percentage of credit to agriculture,
housing or microcredit, or face signiﬁcant ﬁnes.
3.3. Risks and costs of national development banks
The main costs of NDBs are related to the opportunity costs of
the government or compulsory funds used in subsidized long-term
credit, either through direct or indirect mechanisms, plus direct
costs associated with the operation of NDBs.
We can divide risks into general risks and those associated with
each choice of direct or indirect mechanisms of credit creation and
allocation. Moreover, NDBs may crowd out private markets and
hinder the development of long-term capital markets.
General risks are: possibilities of picking losers (Robinson &
Torvik, 2005); agency costs (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014); crony
capitalism (Carvalho, 2014); lack of efﬁciency due to small scale;
and crowding out effects.
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) showhowagency problems can
arise in state ownedﬁnancial institutions, even thoughprofessional
management can help reduce them. Agency costs increase the pos-
sibility of picking losers, which is something that is pervasive in
the literature on industrial policy and the impact of government
driven resource allocation. Moreover, as NDBs expand their roles,
there is also the possibility of picking losers in such situations as
minority shareholders, stock selection etc. Crony capitalism can
distort “picking winners” strategies, and compound their risks,
especially when the selection process of industries is affected less
bydevelopmentopportunities thanby thepolitical actionsof future
subsidized companies. Carvalho (2014) provides evidence that gov-
ernment control over banks leads to signiﬁcant political inﬂuence
over the real decisions of ﬁrms, with non-ﬁnancial companies allo-
cating capital to answer political pressure instead of economic
efﬁciency. As with all public institutions, graft is a considerable risk
for the efﬁcient operation of NDBs, and that is why relatively solid
institutions are a necessary condition for the creation of NDBs.
Moreover, NDBs need scale to be efﬁcient. Given the purpose
of funding long-term projects in industry and infrastructure, scale
is important for NDBs to deliver credit to increasing demand for
long-term funds in an industrialization scenario. For this reason,
NDBs usually have their focus on large investment projects that are
commonly associated with large companies.
Risks surrounding crowding out effects may appear in later
stages of the life-cycle, particularly if NDB credits aremuch cheaper
than the rest of the market. Because shallow ﬁnancial markets
cannot provide sufﬁcient long-term credit at the beginning of the
development process, NDBs can offer credit without displacing
other ﬁnancial institutions. As markets develop, local agents may
be able to provide long-term credit, but NDBs size and subsidies
may prevent the formation of long-term capital markets.
The risks associated with speciﬁc mechanisms either increase
the cost to society or decrease the effectiveness of allocating
resources to long-term ﬁnancial markets. Guarantees are ineffec-
tive if market agents have no conﬁdence in government payments
in case of default, or if government actions are time inconsistent.
Interest rate equalization is ineffective if basic rates are set at high
levels or if the credit market is small and shallow. Also, if NDBs set
interest rates much lower than the basic rate of the private market,
it would increase the likelihood of crowding out effects. Penalties
are particularly distortive in terms of efﬁcient allocation, resulting
in higher interest rate for all local markets.
The last source of risk is related to inertia, refocusing and dis-
solution. As NDBs lose their original effectiveness throughout the
life-cycle, they should refocus their activities towards providing
indirect mechanisms of credit and loans for newly targeted ben-
eﬁciaries, such as small and medium companies or student loans,
for instance, or be privatized. However, it is very hard for public
institutions to disappear. Timing matters, and costs accumulate,
especially as a country develops ﬁnancial markets.
3.4. Life-cycle and examples around the world
At the beginning of the development process, ﬁnancial markets
tend to be shallow and incomplete. In that sense, the role of NDBs
should be to provide and originate long-term credit. As markets
develop, and long-term ﬁnance from the private sector becomes
more abundant, NDBs’ role as a credit provider should turn from
direct to indirect mechanisms, such as government guarantees and
subsidies. When markets are fully developed, NDBs may become
a source of distortion and should provide fewer beneﬁts than the
risks they cause. We can see the pattern of a life-cycle by looking
at the experience of developed and emerging countries. NDBs
The ﬁrst NDB in the United States was the War Finance Corpo-
ration (WFC). The federal government created it in 1918 to give
ﬁnancial support to industries related to the war efforts, and to
provide funds for commercial banks that aided such industries. It
was an off-budget agency funded initially with US$ 300 million
and that was authorized to issue US$ 3 billion of bonds. After the
war, the government extended its activities to assist in the transi-
tion to peacetime conditions. In the spring of 1919, WFC undertook
the ﬁnancing of the railroads, made loans to American exporters,
and provided credit to agriculture, but it was short-lived and was
liquidated in 1925. The federal government recreated it in 1932,
because of the Great Depression, in the guise of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation (RFC) (Butkiewicz, 1995; Butkiewicz &
Solcan, 2016). Initially, its focus was on reﬁnancing of commercial
banks. However, under the Roosevelt administration it started to
target investments in infrastructure, mainly railroads and electric-
ity, loans for agriculture, and exports ﬁnancing. After the outbreak
of the Second World War, its goal shifted to ﬁnance part of the war
effort. It was the main source of funds to the aircraft industry and
the machine-tool sector. According to Freeman (2006), during the
1933-45, the RFC lent out USD33 billion (over USD1.2 trillion in
2015). It was the largest lending institution in the United States in
that period. The RFCwas dissolved in 1956, but it was themodel for
theGermanDevelopmentBank, theKreditanstalt furWiederaufbau
– KfW (Todd, 1992).
Also because of the Great Depression, the Mexican government
created the Mexican Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) in 1934. Similar
to the RFC, the Mexican government restructured it during the Sec-
ondWorldWar to focus on long-termﬁnance (loans and shares) for
infrastructure and industrial projects. After the war, it also played
an important role as a national partner of the US-Eximbank and
multilateral agencies. From the mid-ﬁfties until the early eighties,
NAFIN provided between 30% and 50% of all domestic loans dis-
bursed to the local industry. Its outstanding loans reached 12%of all
Mexican bank loans in the late 1970s. Due to the Mexican external
debt crisis of the 1980s, the government restructured it in 1986,
and the bank lost its role as a provider of long-term ﬁnance for
industrial and infrastructure projects (López, 2012). The Mexican
congress passed a law to forbid NAFIN to originate new loans. Its
main activity in recent years has been to rediscount loans for small
and medium companies that commercial banks originate.
Between the end of the Second World War (1945) and the
Korean War (1954), a new generation of development banks
appeared around the world. The most important ones were those
in Germany, Japan, Brazil and South Korea. The new NBDs in these
countries had a common origin as an institutional response to the
American government requirements of ﬁnancial mechanisms for
the disbursements of loans from the US Eximbank (Bordo, 1993).
In these four countries, the NDBs’ original main goal was to
supply long-term ﬁnance for investments in industry and infra-
structure. As countries matured, they lost importance, with the
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Table 1
Main ﬁnancial indicators of BNDES, Inter-American Development Bank and World
Bank (in US$ million).
BNDES 2014 IADB 2014 World Bank 2014
Total assets 330,253 106,299 343,225
Equity 11,572 23,697 38,637
Net income 3235 548 768
Disbursement 79,317 9423 44,582
Capitalization (%) 21.7 4.5 8.9
ROA (%) 1.0 0.5 0.2
ROE (%) 21.2 2.3 2.0
Source: BNDES, 2016.
exception of the BNDES in Brazil. For the other countries, NDBs
lost market share and diversiﬁed. Japan’s Development Bank, for
example, became the main loan provider for the reconstruction
of areas affected by earthquakes. The Korean Development Bank
became a regular investment bank and KfW is now mostly respon-
sible for student loans in Germany. The Japanese and South Korean
banks were supposed to be privatized just before the ﬁnancial cri-
sis that started in late 2007, and they are close to completing their
respective cycles. Mature economies with fully developed ﬁnancial
markets are set to dismantle or privatize their NDBs.
4. The contemporary role of the BNDES in the Brazilian
Economy
The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) i is the exception
among the NDBs created in the 1950s insomuch as it still plays a
major role in earmarking credit for industrial and infrastructure
projects. Nowadays, it is one of the largest development banks
in the world. In 2014, for example, the value of BNDES disburse-
ments was almost twice the amount provided by the World Bank.
Other ﬁnancial measures, like net income and return of equity,
were also much higher for the BNDES, when we compare it to
IADB and the World Bank, two major international development
banks (see Table 1). One of the main reasons for the large size of
the BNDES lies in the historical underdevelopment of local ﬁnan-
cial markets. Credit in Brazil, until the middle of the 2000s, had ﬁve
salient features: scarcity, high volatility, high cost, high concen-
tration, and segmentation (Torres & Macahyba, 2012). Short and
long-term ﬁnancial markets suffered from these features.
Some of these characteristics are less relevant today, as the
size of the Brazilian credit system increased rapidly from 2004 to
2012. Scarcity and instability are no longer dominant character-
istics, although there are still supply constraints in speciﬁc areas,
such as the market for long-term funds.
Brazilian interest rates are still high, in relation to other large
emerging markets. Real interest rates declined from 2002 to 2012,
from an average of 12% in 2002 to 4% in 2012, but climbed to 6% in
2016. Additionally, Brazilian commercial banks charge spreads that
are still among the highest in the world (Jorgensen & Apostolou,
2013), due to the lack of contestability by potential new entrants.
Concentration among banks increased, even as credit rose. From
1995 to 2012, the share of assets of the 10 largest banks increased
from 71% to 89%, mainly due to consolidation (Banco Central do
Brasil, 2014).
Segmentation is still a marked feature of the Brazilian credit
market. Quasi-ﬁscal funds still form the main supply for long-
term credit. Even though private funds for long-term investments
have risen, commercial banks are still restricted in the provision of
i Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development is known as
BNDES because of its Portuguese acronym (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social).
Fig. 2. Long-term credit for non-ﬁnancial corporations (2002–2013).
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2014) and CETIP (2014).
private long-term funds because of high interest rates. The result
is that the BNDES still holds the largest share the long-term mar-
ket for non-ﬁnancial corporations, with commercial banks and the
corporate bond market still relatively small, as we can see in Fig. 2.
The segmentation of the BNDES into the long-term credit sector,
and commercial banks in other loanable funds markets, remains a
prevalent feature of ﬁnancial markets in Brazil.
Funds managed by the BNDES are earmarked for the acquisition
or export of machinery and equipment, construction of new plants,
or infrastructure projects. In 2013, its share of these markets was
over 70%. Half of its credits were direct operations with corpora-
tions, mainly large companies. The other half was credit reﬁnanced
by commercial banks, which lend mostly to small and medium
companies. Thematurityof these indirectoperations rarelyexceeds
7 years, while BNDES’ direct loans may reach up to 25 years.
In Brazil, SMEs face even more constraints than in more devel-
oped markets, since large companies can access BNDES funds more
efﬁciently. Given high interest rates, the corporate bonds market
reached only 4.6% of GDP in 2013.
After the ﬁnancial crisis, the government used the BNDES as
the main agent for countercyclical ﬁscal policy. Brazilian private
commercial banks curbed the rateof expansionof their loans, short-
ening their length and increasing guarantees. The rate of growth of
non-earmarked credit fell from 46.5% per year in October 2008 to
just 1.0% at the end of 2009 (Banco Central do Brasil, 2014).
In the last quarter of 2008, the Treasury issued large volumes of
debt in order to extend massive new loans to BNDES. As a result,
the Brazilian Treasury, as early as 2010, became BNDES’s main
supplier of funds. From 2007 to 2010, loans from the federal gov-
ernment increased from 6% to 46% of the total sources of the bank.
In 2015, they reached 56%. In the meantime, the share of special
funds decreased to 31% (Fig. 3).
4.1. BNDES as an earmarking credit institution: evidence and
critiques
BNDES plays a leading role in the extension of credit for invest-
ment in infrastructure and industry, and export credit for higher
value added manufactured goods and services. Therefore, large
companies have always been the development bank’s main direct
clients.
Additionally, BNDES has an important role as a channel for other
governmental indirect tools to earmark credit, and it reﬁnanced
in 2013 more than one million new loans related to ﬁxed capital
investments extended by other local banks. In order to avoid com-
petition between the direct and indirect operations there are two
important boundaries. First, commercial banks have preference on
every loan up to R$ 20 million (US$ 7.5 million). Second, BNDES
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Fig. 3. BNDES’s main sources of funds (in %).
Source: BNDES (2016). Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
does not have branches, does not take deposits from the public, and
does not compete with commercial banks except in capital mar-
ket operations. This arrangement is cost effective and allows small
and medium companies to access the earmarked funds of BNDES
through the commercial banks networks, even though they have
shorter maturity and are more expensive than the terms offered in
direct operations.
BNDES is also an important channel for other indirect tools for
earmarking credit, since it offers equalized interest rates and credit
guarantees for speciﬁc loans. Theyareopen toall banks, butbecause
of the risks involved on the payments mechanism adopted by the
government, the market discount rates are set at high levels, mak-
ing them cost ineffective. To compensate for that, BNDES holds
the risks of the government guarantees and subsidies in its books
and transfers the beneﬁts to ﬁnal borrowers. This is evidence that,
unlike in most countries, indirect mechanisms to earmark credit in
Brazil are still cost-ineffective, due mainly to high interest rates on
public debt. Therefore, as guarantees and subsidies are still not able
to fulﬁll their functions as market mechanisms, direct tools are still
the main drivers of earmarking credit in Brazil.
However, this position as a more effective tool for earmarking
credit does not guarantee that BNDES loanshave apositive effect on
companies’ operational results and investment decisions. Carvalho
(2014) highlights how BNDES may spur politically motivated inef-
ﬁcient investments in non-ﬁnancial companies. However, there is
a consensus that BNDES is part of a developmental strategy that has
been renewed and updated for the challenges and opportunities of
a more market-oriented economy (Hochstetler & Montero, 2013).
Unfortunately, there are not many empirical studies on the impact
of BNDES loans on the behavior of Brazilian companies in terms of
investment and adjustment to the economic cycle, and two of the
main ones, Carvalho (2014) andOliveira (2014) present contrasting
results.
Regarding Oliveira (2014), the author ﬁnds evidence that
BNDES loans are particularly relevant for long-term invest-
ment. The author estimates the dynamics of ﬁrm investments in
Brazil through the elasticity of capital expenditures of Brazilian
companies in relation to unexpected monetary policy, ﬁnancial
restrictions, and BNDES ﬁnancing. He concludes that unexpected
monetary shocks and ﬁnancial restrictions are keys to explain
the investment patterns of Brazilian companies. He also ﬁnds
strong empirical evidence that BNDES ﬁnancing policy is important
in explaining investment dynamics. Additionally, Oliveira (2014)
illustrates that ﬁrms thatwould bemore likely to obtain loans from
BNDES are more resilient when facing an unanticipated decline in
cash ﬂow.
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) also analyze the impact of
BNDES ﬁnancing on public companies. Their results are much less
pronounced than Oliveira’s (2014). Even though they ﬁnd that
equity investments by BNDES allow ﬁrms to alleviate capital con-
straints and increase capital expenditures, they also ﬁnd examples
of the government using its minority position to intervene in the
management of ﬁrms, especially in natural resource industries.
They also ﬁnd that BNDES’s allocations do not seem to affect ﬁrm-
level operational performance and investment decisions, although
they do reduce the ﬁrm-level cost of capital due to governmen-
tal subsidies accompanying loans, a result that is corroborated by
Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello, and Marcon (2015).
Inoue et al. (2013) ﬁnd that BNDES ownership does not create
value for other shareholders of invested companies. The authors
analyze the role of BNDES as a minority shareholder, and ﬁnd
a positive effect of those stakes on ﬁrms’ return on assets and
on the capital expenditures of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms with
investment opportunities. However, these positive effects are sub-
stantially reduced when minority stakes are allocated to business
group afﬁliates and as local institutions develop. This is in line
with our main hypothesis regarding the life-cycle trajectory of
NDBs; necessary as countries emerge from developing status, but
increasingly irrelevant as ﬁnancial markets develop. In a lowly-
developed institutional environment, BNDES minority stakes can
improve governance and generate economic return, but asmarkets
develop this effect disappears and, in the future, the role of BNDES
should, if Brazil is slow to develop, be concentrated on long-term
credit operations.
4.2. The life cycle hypothesis and the future of BNDES
Is BNDES an example of the life-cycle hypothesis for NDBs? Our
answer is yes. Until the early 2000s, maturities of bank loans and
of bonds issued in the Brazilian capital markets were very short,
mostly up to two years. Since then, the situation changed. Housing
and corporate long-term debt markets grew faster than GDP, inter-
est ratesdecreasedandmaturities increased. Foreign investors took
large positions in the public debt (17%) and equity markets (more
than 40%). As a result, Brazilian capital markets are the largest in
Latin America in terms of size and liquidity, and Brazilian banks are
large, well capitalized and increasingly international.
Despite that, the BNDES still plays a major role in the long-term
credit market, due mostly to high interest rates. However, most
of the main elements for the development of long-term capital
markets are already in place: scale, liquidity, regulatory stability,
private investors and demand from SMEs and large companies.
Therefore, whenever interest rate is reduced to international lev-
els, most of the indirect operations of BNDES will become largely
funded by commercial banks and we can easily predict that given
lower interest rates, direct origination will be less necessary and
the size of BNDES’ assets will be halved in a relatively short period.
5. The life-cycle hypothesis: should NDBs be replicated in
new emerging markets?
If we look at the evolution of the role of NDBs as seen in the pre-
vious sections, andexempliﬁedby the caseof theBNDES,wecan see
that even thoughNDBs are still a relevant feature in some emerging
markets, their role is typically small in more developed countries.
There is an important debate over the importance of NDBs for
established emerging markets like Brazil, China or South Africa.
The main counter-argument against the extensive use of NDBs in
countries with well-established ﬁnancial markets is the possibil-
ity of the inefﬁciencies highlighted in section 2.3. For developing
countries, earmarking credit by means of NDBs can be relevant
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in funding the long-term projects that otherwise would not be
funded due to incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Most poor countries
cannot get access to funding for long-term projects unless it comes
fromshallow local ﬁnancialmarkets or international organizations.
Industrialization is based, on among other things, long-term credit
that is readily available. Yet, are NDBs a ﬁrst best policy to achieve
rapid growth and industrialization?
The most powerful combination of earmarking tools is credit
origination and the provision of ﬁscal or quasi-ﬁscal funds. As such,
this combination, coupled with efﬁcient bureaucracies capable of
limiting market distortions (and preventing graft), would be the
preferable way to ﬁll the institutional void that decreases the like-
lihood of funding for large infrastructure projects in poor countries.
As ﬁnancial markets develop, the case for a NDB that originates
credit and provides funds weakens, and countries can decommis-
sion these institutions or use the expertise they have accumulated
to manage indirect tools, which is the path that the US and many
countries in Europe have taken.
It is important to notice that alongside the obstacles to properly
earmarking credit for long-term infrastructure projects, there are
some institutional aspects that need to be considered if a country
is to create a successful NDB. From the BNDES experience and the
empirical evidence, the main obstacles to ﬁlling the institutional
void of long-term credit to infrastructure projects are the possi-
bilities of: picking losers (Robinson & Torvik, 2005), opportunity
costs in terms of subsidized loans, crony capitalism, lack of efﬁ-
ciency due to small scale, and crowding out effects. The last is a
characteristic of credit origination, while scale is a characteristic of
market size, but the others depend on some institutional effective-
ness. And therein lies one important issue. For a successful ﬁlling of
the long-term credit void, there should be sufﬁciently strong insti-
tutions to curtail the main risks with opening a development bank,
but, of course, not strong enough to generate a functional long-term
credit market. Therefore, countries with serious governance issues
are not good candidates for the creation of a NDB, while countries
with increasingly better governance would be suitable candidates,
with NDBs likely to improve their development path.
6. Final comments
There would be no use for National Development Banks if ﬁnan-
cial markets were efﬁcient and complete, but that is far from the
reality of emerging markets or poor countries. In the past, many
countries usedNDBs in the development process,with a golden age
period stretching from the 1950s to the early 1980s, in which NDBs
were a tenable solution to the lack of funding sources for long-term
projects, and for the creation of local industries and infrastructure
(Gutierrez et al., 2011).
We deﬁne National Development Banks (NDBs) as government-
sponsored ﬁnancial institutions concerned primarily with the
provision of long-term capital to industry and infrastructure,
ﬁnancedmainly by domestic sources of funding, and offering direct
provision of credit to companies, by means of loans or capital
market operations. We argue for a life-cycle hypothesis for NDBs
in which such institutions are important for the industrialization
and development process while ﬁnancial markets mature, while
becoming less relevant asﬁnancialmarkets develop. As this process
unfolds, NDBs change their role to focus on indirect mechanisms of
long-term ﬁnance, until they themselves are privatized or decom-
missioned.
We tried to complement the life-cycle hypothesis by looking
at the costs and beneﬁts associated with the creation of NDBs
through an examination of the Brazilian National Social and Devel-
opment Bank (BNDES), one of the largest development banks in
the world. The BNDES plays an important role in the Brazilian
economy, but there are arguments against the beneﬁts of its exist-
ence. For instance, Bond (2013) argues that the largest projects
ﬁnanced by the bank show a similar pattern: high level of state
subsidies; lack of transparency; credit to projects with serious
compliance problems on labor and environmental concerns; and
a tendency to privilege certain economic groups. At the same time,
this pattern is a regular one in the industrialization process, with
countries around the world allocating capital to certain economic
groups to foster industrial growth (Maddison, 2010).
In addition, even though state-owned banks are important in
the Brazilian context, the size of the economy is conducive to
different institutional arrangements. Moreover, building efﬁcient
state-owned banks is expensive and time-consuming. Still, we
should note that it was through the coordinated efforts of the
BNDES and other state-owned banks that the Brazilian government
was able to spur fast industrialization, to foster investment, and to
provide a rapid response to the freezing of credit markets follow-
ing the ﬁnancial crisis, even if government could have achieved the
latter through other expansionary ﬁscal policy mechanisms.
Given the underdevelopment of ﬁnancial markets in many
parts of the world, there are authors who advocate the replication
of the BNDES experience in other countries. For instance, Gumede,
Govender, andMotshidi (2011) highlight the example of the BNDES
as an countercyclical agent, and with policies that should be copied
by the Development Bank of South Africa, while Mqoqi (2014) is
more forthright in asking for a direct emulation of BNDES by the
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa. Also, Sanusi
(2012) argues that infrastructure ﬁnancing inNigeria should follow
the example of BNDES and the Indian Infrastructure Finance Com-
pany, not merely in terms of credit allocation, but also institutional
building, although Nigeria may not be suitable for the creation of a
development bank due to poor institutions. There are risks in this
strategy. BNDES has the beneﬁt of economies of scale and has cer-
tainly picked some losers over the years (Robinson & Torvik, 2005).
Therearealsoopportunity costs in termsof subsidized loans, aswell
as the possibility of crony capitalism, and potential crowding out
effects. This last effect can be mitigated by timing the creation and
management of the growth of NDBs. However, policymakers need
toweighother risks against thepossiblebeneﬁtsof addressingakey
market failure regarding long-term credit in developing countries.
NDBs like the BNDES may be replicable on a smaller scale in
poor countries. Beneﬁts include the funneling of long-term credit
into local markets that are not deep enough to fund large long-
term infrastructure projects. The functional model of such a bank
is one in which it has to be capable of dealing with international
institutions and to absorb part of the risk of infrastructure projects,
but without leading the market. In that sense, such an NDB needs
to use the network of local commercial banks to earmark credits
with minimal distortion to local markets. It should not compete for
deposits with commercial banks and should follow international
and local governance rules for this kind of ﬁnancial institution. Our
main conclusion is that NDBs may not be the ﬁrst best solution for
providing long-term ﬁnance in developing countries. Still, they are
a tenable solution for building ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁll an insti-
tutional void in less developed economies characterized by some
measure of solid institutions.
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